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Abstract 
 
The paper presents an adverse selection-based explanation of the fact that some entrepreneurs choose to finance 
multiple projects together by issuing a single security and other entrepreneurs decide to finance each project 
separately. We consider the financing problem of an entrepreneur who has access to two investment projects and 
needs to raise external financing to undertake these projects in the presence of asymmetric information. The 
entrepreneur has private information about the quality of the projects and can choose either to finance the projects 
together by issuing a single security, or to finance the projects separately by issuing two securities, each backed by 
the cash flows from the corresponding projects. We show that the choice of financing depends on the structure of 
information available to outside investors. If there are two types of informed traders and each type knows the true 
value of a different project, the entrepreneur will always choose to finance projects separately.  However, if there is 
only one type of informed trader in the market and she has information about the true value of both projects, then the 
entrepreneur may, in some circumstances, resort to joint financing. 
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1.  Introduction 
Consider an entrepreneur who wishes to undertake two investment projects and, because of 
capital constrains, needs to raise the funds in the external financial markets. The value of the 
projects that he wishes to finance depends on the entrepreneur's quality, and the entrepreneur's 
quality is private information.  Nevertheless, financial markets can form expectations about the 
average quality of entrepreneurs and will price the securities accordingly. As a consequence, a 
good quality entrepreneur, whom we will define more precisely later on in the paper, may 
discover that the market misprices the securities he issues, and he will suffer from dilution. In 
this economy, some traders may choose to become informed for a cost and receive a signal about 
the true value of the projects.  As a result of informed trading, the price system will become more 
efficient, partially (or fully) revealing the true quality of the entrepreneur.  Under these 
conditions, the entrepreneur will choose his financing strategy under which the prices reveal 
more information. However, to maximize his ex-ante expected wealth, should the entrepreneur 
issue only one security backed up by the two investment projects? Or should the entrepreneur 
issue two securities, each security backed up by the cash flows of each project? 
 
This paper presents an asymmetric-information-based explanation of the fact that some 
entrepreneurs choose to finance multiple projects by issuing a single security (what we refer to as 
"joint financing") while other entrepreneurs decide to finance each project separately ("separate 
financing"). We investigate a binary version of the Kyle (1985) model with competitive 
informed traders, and we show that the choice of financing (joint vs. separate) depends on the 
structure of information available to outside investors. 
 
If potentially-informed traders have access to two signals and each signal reveals the quality of 
only one project that the entrepreneur has, we show that the entrepreneur will always choose to 
finance the projects separately.  Under separate financing, informed traders trade in the security 
whose value is very sensitive to their information. As a consequence of this informed trading, the 
price system becomes more informative and the true value of each project gets embedded in the 
stock price. If, instead, the entrepreneur finances the projects jointly, by issuing a single security, 
the value of the security issued turns out to be less sensitive to the information of both types of 
informed traders. Consequently, informed traders' profits decrease and the number of informed 
traders, that the model endogenously determines, decreases.  We show, as a result, that the price 
system reveals less information about the quality of the issuer, and the ex-ante wealth of the 
good-quality entrepreneur is reduced. For these reasons, the issuer will always prefer to finance 
projects separately. 
 
However, if potentially-informed traders have access to only one signal, and the signal is 
informative regarding the quality of the entrepreneur (that is, the signal is informative about the 
quality of each project), we show that in some circumstances, the good-quality entrepreneur 
(referred as the type-h entrepreneur) may resort to joint financing. This is one of the main 
contributions of the paper and the intuition can be explained as follows. Under separate 
financing, if informed traders know the true value of both projects and exactly one project turns 
out to be of bad quality (we refer to this entrepreneur as the mixed type or the type-m 
entrepreneur), then informed traders will concentrate their activity on the one good project, 
easing the task of the market maker to price the security at fair value.  However, if informed 
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traders learn that the entrepreneur has two good projects, they will spread their trading across the 
two securities. This trading separation implies that the price system will incorporate less 
information, and the separation may force the good-quality entrepreneur to issue securities that in 
equilibrium will be more undervalued (with respect to the type-m entrepreneur with only one 
good project). Notice that, in this situation, separate financing still increases the informativeness 
of the price system, but the increase benefits only the type-m entrepreneur. When the cost of 
information production is low, the equilibrium amount of informed trading is so high that the 
mixed type is revealed in the market, and informed traders do not make any profit when only one 
project is of good quality. The ex-ante profits and, consequently, the equilibrium number of 
informed traders are adversely affected by the full revelation of the mixed type. This information 
spillover effect increases the equilibrium degree of under-pricing of the type-h entrepreneur so 
that, in equilibrium, he may prefer joint financing.   
 
Our paper is related to some of the vast literature on security design. Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) 
develop a model in which a good quality firm needs to raise capital under asymmetric 
information and adverse selection.  They show that the firm prefers to issue a more information 
sensitive security (namely, equity) rather than issue a security with low sensitivity to private 
information (debt).  By issuing equity, the firm encourages outside investors to produce private 
information about the project's value. By trading on this information, these specialized informed 
investors reveal their information to the market. This paper is, however, different from Fulghieri 
and Lukin (2001) in several respects. They consider the problem of designing a security (debt vs. 
equity) backed by a project. We consider the problem of choosing the number of projects 
backing a security. 
 
Habib et al. (1997) argue that to finance projects separately is always the preferable choice.  In 
the context of a rational expectations model á la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), they show that 
when several divisions of a firm are spun off into several firms, the price system becomes more 
informative because it reduces the uncertainty that risk-averse, uninformed investors have about 
the value of each single division. As a consequence, their expected demand for shares increases, 
thus increasing firm value. Habib et al.'s results depend crucially on the assumptions on the 
change in liquidity trading, because the amount of liquidity trading plays an important role in 
determining equilibrium prices.
1
  The difference between their model and our model is that for 
Habib et al., resorting to separate financing increases both the informativeness of the price 
system and the expected utility of informed traders, thus driving up the price. By contrast, in our 
model, this latter effect may not materialize when informed traders get a signal on the value of 
both projects.  If the spillover effects are large enough, the price system becomes more 
informative only for the type-m issuer. As a consequence, the degree of adverse selection and the 
resulting dilution for high quality firms increases. When this situation occurs, the entrepreneur 
prefers joint financing. 
 
Chowdhry et al. (2002) use a model of security design based on the principle of information 
aggregation, and show that firms issue different securities to different groups of investors. Each 
                                                             
1Notice that, in a model with risk-averse agents, an increase in expected prices doesn't necessarily correspond to an 
increase in expected utility. See Marin and Rahi (2000), and the so-called Hirshleifer Effect. More informative 
prices worsen risk-sharing opportunities for risk-averse agents, thus lowering their expected utility. 
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firm issues securities that are highly correlated with the private information of the investor to 
whom the securities are marketed. In this respect, Chowdhry et al.'s paper is similar to ours since 
we also show that when there are different types of investors, each type being informed about 
one particular project, it is always optimal for the entrepreneur to finance projects separately and 
to issue different securities. Our paper is, however, different in two main respects. First, we 
consider an economy with a different information structure with respect to theirs, and we show 
how this difference has a profound impact on the results of the model. Second, the number of 
informed traders (that, in turn, determines the degree of information production) is endogenous 
in our model. 
 
DeMarzo (2005) considers first a problem of an informed intermediary willing to sell multiple 
assets in the presence of adverse selection, and always preferring to sell assets separately rather 
than as a pool in the context of a signalling model; then he also shows that an originator who is 
uninformed about the true value of the assets will choose to resort to joint financing (to say it in 
the spirit of the present paper) because pooling will mitigate the underpricing problem similar to 
the one described by Rock (1986). On the same lines, but in a different setting, Nanda and 
Narayanan (1999) present a signalling model in which an undervalued firm splits into component 
businesses in order to obtain cheaper financing. They assume that the market can observe the 
aggregate cash flows of the firm, but not the divisional ones. If the informativeness of cash flows 
from different divisions is different, the firm may be undervalued in the market and willing to 
signal its true value by raising capital through a costly divestiture. Our model is different - and, 
hence complementary with respect to these models, because the information structure is 
different. We assume that though insiders of the firm have private information about the quality 
of the firm, some investors in the market have more precise signals. 
 
Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) show that issuing baskets of securities 
can decrease the losses of liquidity traders caused by informed traders. Baskets of securities have 
lower volatility than do individual securities. Hence, the ability of informed traders to profit from 
their private information is diminished. In contrast with their papers, in our model, the 
entrepreneur decides the financing strategy. That is, the decision is supply driven. In their model, 
this decision is demand driven. 
 
Additionally, our model is also related to the vast literature on venture capital. Most of the 
theoretical literature on venture capital considers the financing and incentive problems facing an 
entrepreneur trying to finance a single project. Notable exceptions include Kanniainen and 
Keuschnigg (2003), Bernile et al. (2007), Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009), Inderst et al. (2007), and 
Inderst and Müller (2003). Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003), and in a similar spirit, Bernile et 
al. (2007) consider an entrepreneur with multiple identical, risky projects and determine the 
relation between the venture capital portfolio structure and the effort level. Fulghieri and Sevilir 
(2009) consider the incentive of a venture-capital firm to concentrate its attention on one or two 
ventures. Inderst et al. (2007) show that the depth of the entrepreneur's financial pockets may 
help resolve his financing problems. The common thread of these papers is that the authors 
investigate the span of a venture capital portfolio, or, as in Inderst et al. (2007), investigate the 
role of the venture capitalist who is cash constrained in an economy where the span of the 
venture-capital portfolio is fixed. In this paper, we fix the number of projects and we investigate 
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the security design problem (i.e. whether an entrepreneur has to issue one or two equity 
securities) in a model with information production and adverse selection. Of all the research, 
Inderst and Müller (2003) address a problem that is most similar to ours, although with many 
differences. They, in fact, study the optimal contracting between individual investors and 
individual project managers (what they refer to as "decentralized financing"), and between 
individual investors and a headquarter that runs multiple projects backed by the same security 
(what they refer to as "headquarter financing"). They model a multi-period economy in which the 
optimal contract offered is debt, address a moral hazard problem, and explore the relation 
between financing constraints and the organizational structure. We model a one-period economy 
in which we restrict our attention to equity, consider the adverse selection problem an 
entrepreneur faces, and explore the effects of information production on financing. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the economy and 
introduce the model. In Section 3, we show that if the signal reveals the quality of the project, 
separate financing always dominates joint financing. In Section 4, we assume that the signal 
reveals the quality of the entrepreneur, and we show that parameter restrictions exist such that 
separate financing could be optimal. In Section 5, we discuss the results and conclude the paper. 
In the Appendix, we include the discussion of a model without information production, and a 
result of financing when the signal reveals the entrepreneur's quality and markets are integrated. 
 
2.  The Model 
Consider an economy that lasts for one period, and the choices available to an entrepreneur who 
wishes to undertake two investment projects and, being capital constrained, needs to raise the 
funds in the external financial markets. 
 
2.1  Players, Actions, and Events 
We assume that all agents in the economy are risk neutral and the riskless interest rate is 
normalized to 0. Agents in this economy are entrepreneurs, market makers, and outside investors 
(investors who trade on information, and liquidity traders). 
 
At  an entrepreneur has access to two different investment projects that are indexed 
respectively by . Project  requires an investment of  dollars at time  and has a 
value  at time . Without loss of generality, we assume that . The realization of 
 can be either  or 0. If , then the project is of good quality. If the project yields 0 
payoff, it is of bad quality. Outside investors and market makers have a common prior-
probability distribution over the quality of both projects, according to which the projects are 
independently and identically distributed with the probability of a project being of good quality 
given by . The NPV of each project is positive:  
Entrepreneurs have private information about the quality of the projects. Namely, they observe a 
,0t
 2,1i i iI 0t
iv
~ 1t III  21
iv
~ v vvi 
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random variable  that is the sum of the values of project 1 and 2: .
2
  Therefore, we 
can view  as the entrepreneur's type, in the sense that it shows the ability of the entrepreneur to 
find profitable investment opportunities. In this sense, a higher value for  implies better 
entrepreneurial quality. Hence, we model three types of entrepreneurs, denoted by h, m, and l. 
Type-h entrepreneurs observe that  and learn that both projects are good; type-m 
entrepreneurs observe that   and learn that one project is good and the other is bad, but they 
do not know which project is bad and which project is good; finally, type-l entrepreneurs learn 
from  that both projects are bad. 
 
The entrepreneur is cash-constrained and needs to raise funds in the financial markets. The set of 
securities the entrepreneur can issue is restricted to equity that he can sell in the form of an IPO. 
Given that the entrepreneur has access to two investment projects and the set of securities is 
restricted to equity, the entrepreneur has two financing strategies available.  First, he can raise 
the required funds by issuing one security backed by the cash flows from both projects. Second, 
the entrepreneur may decide to finance the projects separately. In this case, each project will 
belong to a different company and the entrepreneur will raise the funds to finance project  by 
issuing equity of company . From now on, we will refer to equity of company  as security . 
The entrepreneur will choose the financing strategy that maximizes his expected wealth. 
 
There are two types of outside investors: liquidity traders and informed traders. Liquidity traders 
exert an exogenous dollar demand that is a random variable. In the case of joint financing, the 
entrepreneur issues a single security and we denote liquidity traders' demand for this security by 
. In the case of separate financing, we denote liquidity traders' dollar demand for security  by 
. We impose the following set of assumptions on liquidity traders' demand. 
  
Assumptions 
1. The dollar demands from liquidity traders  and  are uniformly distribute respectively in 
 and ; 
2. Liquidity traders' demands and are independent; 
3.    
 
These assumptions simply make the model tractable and allow us to obtain closed-form 
expressions for the variables of interest. Interestingly, and one of the modeling novelties of the 
paper, we do not impose any restrictions on the amount of noise trading in the case of joint 
financing relative to the amount of noise trading under separate financing (that is, we do not need 
                                                             
2
This restriction on the information structure of insiders rules out partially pooling equilibria 
when the entrepreneur with only one good project deviates and raises the funds necessary to 
finance only the good project. 
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any restriction on the parameter A). Kyle-style models, as the literature generally use, do not 
allow to obtain results on multiple-project financing that are robust to changes in the relative 
amount of informed trading, and use restrictive assumptions about the amount of liquidity traders 
for each financing strategy. The assumption commonly used in the literature is that the variance 
of liquidity demand is the same. In the present model, the amount of liquidity traders in the case 
of joint financing can be greater or smaller than the amount of liquidity trading under separate 
financing. The results are completely independent of this assumption. 
 
Informed traders are atomistic, act as price takers, and have access to the information-production 
technology. Each potentially informed trader is endowed with  dollars. Before trading takes 
place, but after the entrepreneur announces his financing choice, each potentially informed trader 
decides whether to become informed at a cost . She can, then, spend the remaining dollar by 
buying a fraction of a single security in the case of joint financing, or fractions of each security 
in the case of separate financing. Competitive market makers have a prior  on the amount of 
informed traders. They observe the sum of total dollar demands from liquidity and informed 
traders, and use Bayes' rule to update their expectations regarding the quality of the securities 
they market. They, therefore, set prices equal to expected values conditional on the observed 
total order flow (denoted as  throughout this paper). 
 
2.2  The Equilibrium Concept 
We restrict our attention to pooling equilibria, and more specifically, we consider a pooling 
equilibrium in which type-h entrepreneur chooses the financing strategy that minimizes his 
dilution costs, and type-m and type-l pool with type-h by mimicking his financing strategy. We 
eliminate equilibria other than pooling by assuming that the type-l chooses the strategy that 
maximizes the expected share of the projects the issuer retains.
3
 In this case, type-h cannot 
separate because type-l will follow the same strategy. An equilibrium in which type-h and type-l 
pool and choose one financing strategy and type-m separates and chooses the other financing 
strategy is not possible for the same reason. Thus, the entrepreneur will raise an amount of funds 
that is exactly equal to the required investment because the type-h entrepreneur will issue 
securities that are undervalued in the market.  In the case of joint financing, the entrepreneur will 
issue equity in the amount necessary to raise . When the entrepreneur finances projects 
separately, he raises  by selling security 1 and raises  by selling security 2. The entrepreneur 
announces whether he will finance the projects jointly, issuing a single security in the amount of 
, or he will issue two securities at the beginning of the period, . In equilibrium, the 
market maker determines the fraction of equity that the entrepreneur issues and sells to outside 
investors, denoted as in the paper in the case of joint financing, or, the fraction of security , 
, in the case of separate financing.  In this economy, we define an equilibrium as follows: 
                                                             
3
We have assumed for simplicity that the values of both projects are equal to 0 for the type-l 
entrepreneur, and insiders will have zero expected wealth under any financing strategy. 
Therefore, they are indifferent between joint and separate financing. 
ic1
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Definition 
An equilibrium is given by a measure  of informed traders, an amount and an informed 
traders' break-even condition such that the following three requirements are satisfied: 
a. Market makers' beliefs about the amount of informed traders in the market are rational, 
that is,   
b. The fraction of equity that the entrepreneur needs to sell in order to raise the required 
amount of financing  is given by where  is the total order flow submitted 
to the market makers; 
c. The ex-ante expected profits of each informed trader are zero. 
Depending on the informativeness of the signal, both market makers and informed traders will 
play different strategies, and the game they play will lead to different equilibria. In the following 
section, we assume that two types of potentially-informed traders exist. The first type can learn 
the true value of the first project, and only of the first project, at a cost . The second type can 
learn the true value of the second project, and only of the second project, at a cost . In other 
words, when this situation occurs, the signal reveals the quality of the project.  In Section 4, we 
assume that only one signal is available for potentially-informed traders and this signal reveals 
perfectly the quality of the entrepreneur: if an informed trader acquires the signal, she learns the 
true value of both projects.  We show that the results of the model change significantly when a 
potentially informed trader can observe the true value of both projects. 
 
Finally, we must notice that in the current economy, but in the absence of information 
production, the choice of financing becomes irrelevant and the entrepreneur is indifferent 
between separate and joint financing. This result, that we derive more formally in the Appendix, 
implies that the different conclusions that we reach in what follows regarding the choice of 
financing can be attributed solely to the effects of information production. 
 
3.  The Signal Reveals the Quality of the Project 
In this section, we assume that a trader can spend  dollars and becomes informed about the 
quality of one project. More precisely, a trader of type 1 can spend dollars and receives a 
signal that is informative about the first project. A trader of type 2 can acquire a signal about the 
second project at a cost . Without loss of generality, we assume that . Both signals 
are perfectly informative: after acquiring the information, an informed trader of type  knows the 
true value of project . Let  be a signal about the quality of project  received by a 
trader of type . If the signal is good, and  at  . If then the signal is bad 
and  at . In this case, the signal reveals the quality of the project, but not the quality of 
the entrepreneur. 
 
In what follows, we first derive equilibria for the different choices of financing. Then, we 
compare these equilibria and choose the one that maximizes the ex-ante expected wealth of the 
type-h entrepreneur. 
 
3.1  Separate Financing 
Under separate financing, the entrepreneur offers two securities for sale, each backed by the cash 
 ,
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flows from each project. Each security is sold in the corresponding market. We assume that 
markets are segmented, that is, market makers in one market cannot observe the total order flow 
in the other market. In what follows, we derive the equilibrium in one market.  The equilibrium 
in the second market will be identical. 
 
3.1.1.  First Market 
The dollar demand of liquidity traders in the first market is uniformly distributed on  with 
density function given as follows (we omit subscripts for notational simplicity): 
 
 (1) 
 
At the beginning of the period, a measure  of informed traders decides to become informed. 
Informed traders are atomistic and act as price takers. If the signal is good, they will buy one 
dollar worth of the security, and the total dollar demand from informed traders will be . If the 
signal is bad, they do not submit any order.
4
  The demand of liquidity traders  is realized at the 
same time. Informed and liquidity traders submit their orders simultaneously to market makers. 
Market makers observe the total order flow  and use Bayes' rule to update their 
probability of the project being good, setting the price for the security equal to the conditional 
expectation of the cash flows of the project. 
Let  represent market makers' beliefs about the equilibrium amount of informed traders in the 
market. Given uniformly distributed liquidity demand, Bayesian updating takes a simple form. If 
the total order flow is less than then market makers learn that the demand from informed 
traders was zero and, hence, the project is bad.  In this case, the issue fails.  If the total order flow 
is greater than , but less than then the posterior probability of the project being good is 
equal to the prior probability  (from Bayes' rule: ). If 
the total order flow is greater than market makers correctly infer that there is positive amount 
of informed trading in the market and the project is good. In equilibrium, market makers' beliefs 
are rational. That is, . The proportion of equity the firm has to sell  is, then, 
given by: 
 
 (2) 
 
                                                             
4
Shortselling is not permitted for informed and liquidity traders. Only market makers are allowed 
to short sell the security in order to absorb net order flow and avoid rationing. 
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This amount is, therefore, piecewise constant. When the total order flow is low enough, there is 
no updating, even if the project is good. However, when the realization of the total order flow is 
high enough, market makers correctly infer that the project is good (full revelation) and the price 
of the equity is set equal to its true value. Given the pricing rule (2), the ex-ante expected profits 
of each informed trader are given by: 
 
 (3) 
 
We can rewrite the last expression as: 
 
 
(4) 
 
where the first equality comes from the fact that the second term in parenthesis is zero. When 
liquidity demand is high enough, the issuer's type is revealed and informed traders do not make 
any profits. 
Since the probability that the project's type is not revealed is equal to , we 
can derive the equilibrium amount of informed traders  by equating (4) to zero: 
 
 (5) 
 
3.1.2.  Expected Wealth of the Entrepreneur 
The residual fraction of equity that the entrepreneur with the good project retains depends on the 
realization of the demand of liquidity traders. If this amount is low, no updating occurs on the 
probability of the project being good and the issuer suffers from dilution. If the realization of the 
liquidity demand is high enough, the type of the project is fully revealed (as being good) to the 
market and the entrepreneur sells the security for its true value. We can express the ex-ante 
expected wealth of the issuer of the good project as: 
 
 (6) 
 
Using the zero profit condition in (5) and simplifying, we obtain that the expected wealth of the 
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entrepreneur in one market, conditional on the project being good, is given by: 
 
 (7) 
 
The expected wealth of the entrepreneur in (7) consists of two terms. The first term,  is the 
full information value of the project. Intuitively, positive-informed trading occurs only when the 
value of the project is equal to Hence, the entrepreneur is able to obtain the full information 
value of the project while bearing some costs. The second term, the cost borne by the issuer, is 
the per dollar cost of information production multiplied by the size of the issue and adjusted for 
the probability that informed traders can use this information to make profits. 
 
3.1.3.  Both Markets 
In the second market, the expected wealth of the entrepreneur who has a good project is given by 
the same expression (7). The type-h entrepreneur has two projects that are both of good quality. 
Hence, in the case of separate financing, we have proven the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1 When the entrepreneur finances the projects separately, the equilibrium ex-ante 
expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur, , is given by: 
 
 (8) 
 
That is, the equilibrium ex-ante expected wealth of the entrepreneur of the type-h is equal to the 
NPV of the two projects, minus the dilution costs (which are equal to ). 
 
3.2  Joint Financing 
In the case of joint financing, the two projects are pooled together and the value of the security 
that the entrepreneur sells is given by: 
 
 
(9) 
 
The entrepreneur has to raise the amount necessary to finance both projects, that is .  In the 
previous case (separate financing), a certain number of informed traders were informed about the 
true value of the securities in each market. But the information they had was homogeneous 
among traders in that market. In the market for the first security, for example, all informed 
traders had the same information regarding the first security, and no trader had superior 
information about the payoff of the second project. The situation is different in the case of joint 
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financing: the entrepreneur issues only one security and its payoff depends on the values of both 
projects.  In such a case, two types of informed traders will be trading in equilibrium, and both 
types have less than perfect information about the true value of the security. 
Let  and  be the equilibrium numbers of informed traders of each type. In the Appendix, 
we prove the following: 
 
Result The number of informed traders of the first type is equal to the number of informed 
traders of the second type. That is,   
 
The demand of liquidity traders is uniformly distributed on . Market makers, given their 
rational beliefs, will observe the total order flow and update their expectations about the value of 
the cash flows. Consider Figure 1. Depending on the total order flow, no updating, full 
revelation, or partial revelation of the entrepreneur's type will occur. 
 
Figure 1 
 
From Figure 1, we can see that we have five different regions for the total order flow  
. If  , then market makers infer that both projects are bad and the 
issue fails. If then market makers infer that both projects cannot be good and use 
Bayes' rule to calculate their expectations regarding the cash flows:
5
 
 
 
 
If  then no updating occurs, market makers do not learn any information, and the 
                                                             
5
Notice that in this case, the firm can be either of type-m or type-l. Without loss of generality, we 
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conditional expected value is equal to their prior, i.e.: . If 
 then the market makers infer that both projects cannot be bad and the 
conditional expected value is given by  Finally, if the total order 
flow falls in the region between  and , we have full revelation that both projects 
are of good type and the conditional expected value will be equal to the true value of the cash 
flows: that is, . 
 
Each type's informed traders' profits will depend on the realization of the order flow. The order 
flow will, in turn, depend on the quality of the projects.  If both projects are good, then informed 
traders of both types will be trading in the market.  If, for example, only project 1 is good, then 
only informed traders who bought a signal about the first project will be present in the market.   
 
Consider the ex-ante expected profits of an informed trader who decides to purchase a signal 
about the value of the first project. With probability she will receive a good signal and will 
submit a buying order. Her profits are, then, given by: 
 
 (10) 
 
The intuition behind (10) goes as follows. The first two terms represent the per dollar profits 
when both projects are good. The probability that this condition will be realized is . The total 
order flow is, then, equal to and can fall in regions III, IV, and V of Figure 1. The 
first term is the per dollar profit when  falls in the third region; the second term is the profit 
when  falls in the fourth region. When the total order flow falls in the fifth region, the type is 
fully revealed and the profits of an informed trader are zero. Similarly, the third and the fourth 
terms of (10) give the per dollar profits when the first project is good, but the second project is 
bad. The total order flow is, then,  and can fall in regions II, III, and 
IV of Figure 1. In region II, the issue is cancelled. The third and the fourth terms represent the 
profits when the total order flow falls in regions III and IV, respectively. Substituting the values 
of the probabilities, and simplifying the terms, we can write the zero profit condition for the 
informed trader as: 
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 (11) 
 
From the above zero profit condition, it follows that the equilibrium amount of informed traders  
  is equal to: 
 
 (12) 
 
Consequently, the expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur is given by: 
 
 (13) 
 
The first term corresponds to the wealth of the type-h entrepreneur when the total order flow is 
not informative; the second term, to the case when there is partial revelation; and the third term, 
to the case when the type is fully revealed to the market. Plugging the expression for from 
(12) into (13), we obtain the following lemma. 
  
Lemma 2 The expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur under joint financing is given by: 
 
 (14) 
 
Notice that, as in the case of separate financing, the expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur 
consists of two terms. However, now the first term, , is less than the full 
information value because positive informed trading occurs not only when the issuer is 
of type-h, but also when the issuer is of type-m. That is, the price system is less informative. The 
cost borne by the entrepreneur is, again, the cost of information production per dollar of trade  
multiplied by the size of the issue ; however, the probability adjustment is now equal to 
. 
 
3.3  Choice of Financing When the Signal Reveals the Quality of the Project 
We are therefore ready to state our first result: 
Proposition 1 If there are two types of informed traders in the market, and each type is informed 
about the true quality of only one project, then the entrepreneur will always finance the projects 
separately. 
 
Proof. We need to prove that the type-h entrepreneur will suffer from less dilution when he 
finances the projects separately. That is, we need to show that the expected wealth is greater 
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under separate financing than under joint financing. Using Lemma 2 and the definition of   
given in (12), we simplify and get: 
 
 (15) 
 
From (12), we have that: 
 
 (16) 
 
Then, using (15) and (16), we obtain: 
 
 
(17) 
where the first inequality comes from (16), and the last equality comes from Lemma 1.    
When we have two types of informed traders in the market, each informed about the quality of 
one project, financing projects separately is a dominating strategy. Pooling projects together 
reduces the value of information for each type of informed traders and the number of informed 
traders decreases. Notice, in fact, that by comparing (5) and (12), we see that the condition 
 holds. That is, the relative amount of informed trading is greater in the case of separate 
financing than in the case of joint financing. Or equivalently, the price system is more 
informative in the case of separate financing for a given amount of informed trading. When 
fewer informed traders trade on their information, the price system becomes less informative, 
and the degree of adverse selection in the market increases, reducing the expected wealth of the 
entrepreneur. Therefore, the entrepreneur will always finance the projects separately. 
 
4  The Signal Reveals the Quality of the Entrepreneur 
We have assumed so far that two signals are available: one about the first project, and the other 
about the second project. In this section, we assume that there is only one signal available to 
potentially-informed traders, and this signal reveals perfectly the entrepreneur's quality. In other 
words, if an informed trader acquires the signal, she learns the true value of both projects.  More 
formally, the set of available signals consists of one perfectly revealing signal , where  
 If , then project  is good; if , then project  is bad. A potentially-
informed trader can pay a cost  and observes the signal . It turns 
out that the results of the model change drastically when the structure of available signals is 
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different. 
 
4.1  Joint Financing 
It is more intuitive to consider first the case when the entrepreneur announces that he will finance 
both projects by issuing a single security. The payoff structure to this joint firm is given by (9). 
Let  be the number of informed traders in equilibrium. The strategy of each informed trader 
will now depends on both  and . If both projects are good, that is, , then the 
informed trader will buy one dollar worth of security. If both projects are bad, that is, , 
then the informed trader will not trade. Her decision whether to trade or not when one project is 
good and the other is bad, i.e. , will depend on the value of the parameters of the 
model. We will proceed in the following order. First, we solve the model for the case when 
informed traders do not buy the security when they learn that , and then for the 
case when they do trade when . Then we state under what parameter values these 
cases will, indeed, be the equilibria of the model. 
 
Let us first assume that informed traders do not trade when only one project is good. That is, let 
us assume that each informed trader uses the following equilibrium strategy: buy one dollar 
worth of the security when both projects are good and do not trade otherwise. 
 
Given this informed traders' strategy, market makers will update their expectations about the 
value of the cash flows in the following way. If the total order flow  is less than  then 
both projects cannot be good and the issue fails.  If , the signal is not informative, 
and the posterior expected value for the value of the firm is equal to its prior: that is,  
 If the total order flow is greater than A, then both projects are good and the 
expected value of the firm is given by  The zero profits condition of the informed 
traders is given by: 
 
 (18) 
 
Informed traders will trade only when both projects are good and will earn positive profits only 
when the total order flow is below A. The ex-ante expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur is 
given by: 
 
 (19) 
 
Using (18) to express  and substituting it into (19), we find that if, in 
equilibrium, informed traders trade only when both projects are good, then the ex-ante expected 
wealth of the type-h entrepreneur in the case of joint financing is given by: 
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 (20) 
 
Note that the result is almost identical to the case of separate financing in the previous section. 
The only difference is that the cost is divided by  instead of  because the ex-ante 
probability of submitting an order for an informed trader is now . 
 
Let us now consider the case when informed traders also submit buying orders when only one 
project is good. In this case, informed traders will not trade only if both signals are bad. After 
adjusting the market makers' pricing rule, and following a similar logic as in the previous case, it 
is straightforward to prove that, if in equilibrium, informed traders do not trade only when both 
projects are bad, then ex-ante expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur in the case of joint 
financing is given by: 
 
 (21) 
The first term in parenthesis is greater than the first term in (20), reflecting that positive informed 
trading reveals less information. The second term is less than  because the probability of 
positive informed trading is higher. Note that =  when . This value turns out to be 
the threshold such that for all values of  below this value, a positive-informed trading 
equilibrium occurs only when the issuer is of type-h, and for all values of  above this threshold, 
we find a positive-informed trading equilibrium when the issuer is either type-h or type-m. To 
prove the following lemma, we have only to check that informed traders' strategies are, indeed, 
optimal, given market makers' beliefs. 
 
Lemma 3 If there is a positive amount of informed traders in equilibrium, then for all values of  
  such that , informed traders trade only when both projects are good, and the ex-ante 
expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur in the case of joint financing is given by: 
 
 (22) 
 
and for all values of c such that    informed traders do not trade only when both projects 
are bad, and the ex-ante expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur in the case of joint financing 
is given by: 
 
   (23) 
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4.2  Separate Financing 
When the entrepreneur announces that he will finance the two projects separately, informed 
traders' strategies change in the following way.  If only one project is good, then she will trade in 
this security. If both projects are bad, she will not trade. If both projects are good, she will trade 
in the security where expected profits are higher. In equilibrium, the expected profits will be the 
same, and an informed trader will be indifferent between trading in the first or the second 
security so that half of the informed traders will trade in the first security and the other half will 
trade in the second security.
6
 As a result, "excessive" informed trading will occur when the 
entrepreneur is type-m and has only one good-quality project, and less informed trading will 
occur when the entrepreneur is of type-h. As we will show, the type-h entrepreneur is worse off 
because of this information spillover effect. 
 
Note that the equilibrium strategy the informed traders use now depends on the values of both 
projects.  Accordingly, we can reasonably assume that market makers for a security, correctly 
anticipating the behavior of informed players in equilibrium, will observe the total order flow in 
the other security to learn additional information when setting the pricing rule. In this section, we 
will start our analysis assuming that markets are segmented and the market makers cannot 
observe the total order flow in the other market.
7
 
 
We can write the ex-ante expected profits of each informed trader as (we, again, omit subscripts 
for notational simplicity): 
 
   (24) 
 
where the first term represents the trading profits when both projects are good and the number of 
informed traders in each security is  and the second term represents the trading profits when 
only one project is good and all informed traders trade in this security. Note that, in the above 
calculations, we assumed that  In other words, when the equilibrium amount 
                                                             
6
We implicitly assume that informed traders cannot split their orders. The informed trader then 
randomizes between trading in the first and the second markets when both projects are good. The 
probability of choosing each market is the same and equal to 0.5. 
7
For the sake of completeness, in the Appendix we relax this assumption, allowing markets to be 
integrated, and we show that 1. the main results of this section holds (i.e. for some parameters of 
the problem, the entrepreneur may resort to separate financing) and 2. contrary to intuition, the 
expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur can be lower than in the case of segmented markets.  
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of informed trading is low enough, there is a positive probability to earn non-zero profits, even 
when only one project is good. From (24), the equivalent condition is    If the cost 
of information production is lower than the above threshold , then the good project is perfectly 
revealed when the second project is bad, and all informed trading is concentrated in the market 
with the good project.  From now on, we assume that  and we consider only the case when 
informed traders do not make any profits when the issuer is of type-m. Under this assumption, 
the effect of the information spillover is of important magnitude, and the degree of adverse 
selection in the case of separate financing may become so high that the issuer will prefer to 
finance projects jointly. 
If  the second term of (24) disappears, and the zero profit condition becomes: 
 
   (25) 
 
The expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur from financing the first and the second project is 
the same. To calculate his expected wealth, we consider only one security and multiply this 
expression by two. That is, the ex-ante expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur becomes: 
 
   (26) 
 
where the third equality is obtained by substituting (25). We have, therefore, proved that: 
 
Lemma 4 If a positive amount of informed trading occurs in equilibrium and the cost of 
information production is below , then ex-ante expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur in 
the case of separate financing is given by: 
 
   (27) 
 
4.3  The Choice of Financing 
Whether the entrepreneur chooses separate or joint financing depends, again, on the difference in 
expected wealth. 
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Proposition  2  If there is positive amount of informed trading in equilibrium, the entrepreneur's 
financing choice will depend on the information production costs: 
1. When the cost of information production c is low enough,   then the 
entrepreneur is indifferent between joint and separate financing. 
2. When the cost of information production  satisfies , then the entrepreneur 
will finance projects jointly.  
Proof.   Let us first consider the case when  In this case, under joint financing and the 
strategies played in equilibrium, informed traders trade only when both projects are good. Using 
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, and more precisely, from (22) and (27), we observe that , and 
the entrepreneur is indifferent between joint and separate financing. Now let us consider the case 
when  so that the information production cost is at an intermediate level. We assume 
here that , which is equivalent to  Using (23) and (27), we can write the 
difference between  and  as: 
 
   (28) 
 
given that      
The intuition behind this result is simple. Under both separate and joint financing, informed 
traders make positive profits only when both projects are good. Recall, in fact, that under joint 
financing, given that  positive informed trading occurs only when both projects are good; 
under separate financing when  the type-m issuer does not make any profits. As a result, 
the relative value of the demand from informed traders is the same for both financing strategies. 
Given market segmentation, the equilibrium in each security market under separate financing is 
simply a scaled-down version of the equilibrium under joint financing. However, when the 
information production cost is in the stated range, we have two countervailing forces at play on 
the relative amount of informed trading. On the one hand, under the parameter restrictions, the 
type-h entrepreneur faces less adverse selection under joint financing. Intuitively, in the case of 
separate financing when the cost of information production is low enough, informed traders 
make profits only when both projects are good. However, when the projects are financed jointly, 
informed traders make profits not only when both project are good, but also when only one 
project is good. That is, informed traders make profits in more states of the world than in the case 
of separate financing. The ability to generate profits in more states of the world increases the 
relative amount of informed trading under joint financing, thus decreasing the dilution costs that 
cause the issue. On the other hand, under joint financing, positive informed trading occurs not 
only when the entrepreneur is of type-h, but also when he is of type-m. Consequently, the market 
makers cannot separate type-h from type-m entrepreneurs, even after the high realization of the 
total order flow reveals that there is a positive amount of informed trading. That is, the market 
will realize that the entrepreneur is either of type-h or of type-m, and the entrepreneur of type-h 
continues to be underpriced. From type-h entrepreneur's point of view, the inability of the market 
makers to separate types decreases the relative impact of informed trading on the 
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informativeness of the price system, thus increasing the dilution costs he will bear. The relative 
magnitude of these two effects determines the equilibrium financing strategy. It turns out that for 
, the first effect dominates the second, and the entrepreneur prefers joint financing. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we present an asymmetric-information rationale of why some entrepreneurs choose 
to finance multiple projects by issuing a single security (joint financing) and other entrepreneurs 
decide to finance each project separately (separate financing).  We show that in a model with 
asymmetric-information regarding the quality of the projects and a fortiori the quality of the 
securities sold by the entrepreneur, but without information production, the choice of financing is 
never important and the entrepreneur is indifferent between joint and separate financing.  
However, we show that when we add information production, the entrepreneur's financing 
choice will depend on the structure of the signals available to potentially-informed traders.  If 
there are more signals available to potentially-informed traders and each signal reveals the 
quality of only one project that the entrepreneur has, we show that the entrepreneur will always 
choose to finance the projects separately.  However, if there is only one signal available to 
potentially-informed traders, and the signal is informative regarding the quality of the 
entrepreneur (that is, the signal is informative about the quality of each project), we show that in 
some circumstances, the entrepreneur may resort to joint financing. 
  
c   cp ,2
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6.  Appendix 
6.1   A Simple Model Without Information Production 
In this section, we construct a simple model and show that under the assumption we spell out in 
the paper, but in the absence of information production, the entrepreneur is indifferent between 
separate and joint financing. This initial step is important because it shows that we can attribute 
the results on the choice of financing that we find in the main body of the paper solely to the 
effects of information production. For what follows, an entrepreneur has access to two projects 
that are independently and identically distributed. Project requires investment  at the 
beginning of the period and pays off  at the end of the period. The value of  can be either 
good or bad: . The entrepreneur has no cash and can finance either both projects 
together, or each project separately by issuing securities in the market. For simplicity, we restrict 
the set of available securities to equity. The NPV of each project is positive, given all public 
information available to the market. Only the entrepreneur, however, knows the true value of the 
projects. Consider an entrepreneur who has to finance two projects which are both of good 
quality. If he decides to finance them together by issuing only one security, in order to raise the 
required financing    then he has to sell the proportion  of equity as follows: 
 
   
(29) 
 
If, instead, he decides to finance the projects separately, then he has to sell a fraction: 
 
   
(30) 
 
of each project. Define    and    as the expected wealth to the entrepreneur with two good 
projects in the case of joint and separate financing. We can write these figures respectively as: 
 
   (31) 
 
and 
 
   (32) 
 
It is straightforward to show that the difference in expected wealth is equal to the following 
expression: 
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(33) 
If, under separate financing, an entrepreneur has to sell a higher proportion of the project which 
is more underpriced, then he will prefer to resort to joint financing. When the entrepreneur 
chooses to finance his projects together instead of financing them separately, he sells each dollar 
of the cash flows from the first project at a higher price and each dollar of the cash flows from 
the second project at a lower price as compared to the case of separate financing. If, in addition, 
, then these two effects exactly offset each other and the entrepreneur is indifferent 
between the choices of financing. If the first effect dominates the second, and the 
entrepreneur finances the projects together. If , the second effect is stronger, and he 
finances the projects separately. That is, under a quite general model, the relative underpricing of 
each project plays an important role in the choice of financing. When, however, we impose the 
additional parameter restrictions that we included in the main model, and more precisely, a.  
 ; b. the quality of the project can be either good or bad (with realization  or 0, 
respectively); and c.  , we find that we can re-write (29), and (30) respectively as: 
 
 
 
and 
 
   
(34) 
 
The difference in expected wealth between the two different financing choices is equal to: 
 
   (35) 
 
and the choice of financing is never relevant. What we showed is that under the assumptions 
spelled out in the paper, but in an economy without information production, the choice of 
financing (joint vs. separate financing) is never important. 
 
6.2 Result.  The number of informed traders of the first type is equal to the number of informed 
traders of the second type. That is,   
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume that   . Then, the market makers will 
update their expectations about V after observing the total order    in the following way. 
1. When  then both projects are bad, and the issue fails; 
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2. When  either both projects are bad, or project 2 is bad; 
3. When  both projects cannot be good; 
4. When  no updating will occur; 
5. When  both projects cannot be bad; 
6. When  project 1 is good; 
7. When  both projects are good. 
 
The ex-ante expected profits of the informed trader with private information on the first project 
are given by: 
 
and the profits of the informed trader of the second type are given by: 
 
 
Subtracting the second expression from the first, and equating to zero, we have: 
 
and it follows that the amount of informed traders of different types must be the same in 
equilibrium.    
 
6.3.  The Signal Reveals the Quality of the Entrepreneur: The Case of Separate Financing when 
Markets are not Segmented 
We relax the assumption that markets are segmented and assume that market makers can observe 
the total order flows in both securities. Common intuition would suggest that the type-h 
entrepreneur is likely to be worse off when market makers can observe the total order flow in 
only one security, but cannot observe the total order flow in the other one. That is, if market 
makers are able to observe the total order flows in both securities, they may be able to infer more 
information and will price securities more accurately. We show that the above intuition is not 
always correct, and we give an example when a type-h entrepreneur may be worse off when the 
markets are integrated. 
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The strategy of an informed trader will remain the same as in the case of segmented markets: she 
will trade in the security backed up by the good project and will not trade in the other one when 
only one project is good; she will not trade in any security if the projects are both bad; and she 
will randomize between securities with 0.5 probability if both projects are good. The total dollar 
demand from informed traders in security  will then be 0 if project  is bad,  if both projects 
are good, and  if project  is good and the other project is bad. Here again we assume, for the 
sake of simplicity, that the equilibrium measure of informed traders  is greater than , so 
informed traders do not make any profits when only one project is good and the information 
spillover effect is strong. Market makers will update their beliefs about the quality of the projects 
after observing the total order flows in both securities denoted as  Their posterior 
beliefs will depend on the values of both and (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2
 
Proposition 3 If then the ex-ante expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur is higher 
when markets are segmented. 
 
Proof. Let us assume that market makers can observe the total order flow in both markets    
 They will use the following updating rule, given the equilibrium strategy of informed 
traders. If  falls in region 1 of Figure 2, then both projects are bad. If   falls in region 2, then 
either both projects are bad or both projects are good, and the issue fails. If  falls in region 3, 
then both projects are good. If  falls in region 4A, then the second project cannot be bad.  If  
falls in region 4B, then the first project cannot be bad. If  falls in region 5A, then project 2 is 
good and project 1 is bad. Finally, if  falls in region 5B, then project 1 is good and project 2 is 
bad.  
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Informed traders will make positive profits from trading when both projects are good and when 
only   falls in regions 4A or 4B. Their expected profits are given by: 
 
 
 
The expected wealth of the type-h entrepreneur becomes: 
 
 
 
Using (26) and simplifying, we have that:    and the entrepreneur is 
better off when markets are segmented.    
 
The intuition of this result goes as follows: market makers will update their beliefs about the 
quality of the projects after observing the total order flows in both markets  Their 
posterior beliefs will depend on the values of both  and  For example, if  falls in region 
1 in Figure 2, the market makers infer that both projects are bad and both issues will fail. Notice 
that now the price system is more informative compared to the case when markets were 
segmented.  However, the type-h issuer can be worse off as a result of the increase in the 
informativeness of the price system. When  falls in region 2, market makers learn that the 
issuer cannot be of type-m. If type-m was strongly underpriced, learning that the issuer is not of 
type-m may bring the expectation of the market makers about the values of the projects to the 
point where it is less than the amount of the required investment and the issue fails (this 
condition is satisfied when that is, when the expectation of the value of the project 
conditional on the fact that the type of the issuer is not m is less than the amount of required 
investment I) Thus, the type-h entrepreneur will not be able to undertake the projects in some 
states of the world because he will be "pooled" with the type-l entrepreneur by market makers. 
This possibility of pooling is why the type-h entrepreneur may be better off under market 
segmentation.   
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